

2009 年世界運動會之個案研究

——治理網絡的觀點

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摘 要

本研究之目的在於調查 2009 世界運動會的治理網絡，並嘗試透過了解其建構過程、結構來初步了解其績效。本文首先回顧治理網絡相關概念，建構研究基礎架構，並輔以文獻蒐集及半結構式訪談蒐集研究資料。本研究發現此網絡治理形態屬於網絡行政組織 (Network Administrative Organization, NAO)，故採用 NAO 做為衡量效率的標準——關係正式化程度、多重性及進行該網絡效率的評估。本研究發現 2009 世界運動會網路之組織合作效率有待加強之原因包括：1.各組織缺乏正式性的文件規範各組織之機能、責任與義務分工。2.缺乏強而有力的協調者處理網絡成員之衝突。上述情形或多或少暗示著網絡的成員多從個別組織的角度進行治理行為，而未以整體網絡效益為考量。

關鍵詞：高雄、2009 世界運動會、網絡治理

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A Study of the 2009 World Games-Network Governance Perspectives

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Abstract

The aim of the paper sought to identify the process used to establish the governance network, and to make a preliminary assessment of its performance. This study adopts the network governance concepts and how to use networks as a form of governance, how contingency issues affect the development as well as how contingency issues affect the development of networks, and, how evaluate the effectiveness, especially in non-profit networks and project networks. The data collection includes semi-structured interview and government's official documents. These documents include various network members involved in 2009 World Games and selected representatives of network organizations. The results of the study illustrated that there was clearly a three stage process that led to the development of the network. It found that the network formed for governance is network administrative organization. The effectiveness of the governance network in place for the 2009 World Games is not high due to the lack of formality in defining the function, obligation and rights of each network member organization. In addition, there is no power coordinator to deal with the conflicts that have emerged between network member organizations. This suggests that network members have not yet grasped the difference between governing the relationships in the network on the basis of network outcomes rather than impacts on outcomes rather than on individual organization.

Keywords: Kaohsiung, 2009 World Games, governance network

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I. Introduction

It is generally accepted that hosting a high profile world class sporting event can bring some economic benefit, such as broadcasting rights, tourism revenue, sponsorship, or urban regeneration or development to a city, region or country. Besides these economic benefits, sport events can also be seen as a tool for propaganda and diplomacy. For example, South Korea mended their relationship with North Korea through their joint team for Olympic Games in 1988 and their relationship with Japan through co-hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2002. “Major sports events also provide a platform for host locations to benefit from positive place marketing effects, for governing bodies to develop their major event delivery capacity, for volunteers to gain valuable experience and for communities to enjoy a feel good factor.”¹

These impacts are maximized with effective partnerships between central government, governing bodies, and local organizing committees. It was a combination of these perceived benefits that led to Taiwan to bid for hosting the 2009 World Games. The special political status of Taiwan and the country's lack of experience in hosting international multi-sport events that make the 2009 World Games became a difficult task, not only for the organizing committee, but also other organizations such as central government and local government. The majority of literature on Taiwan's sports events, however,

¹ UK Sport. Economic benefit from major sporting events more than treble the investment-UK sport, report [Press release] (UK, July 31, 2007). Retrieved February 20, 2008, from http://www.uk sport.gov.uk/news/economic_benefit_from_major_sporting_events_more_than_treble_the_investment_uk_sport_report/

focuses on commercial aspects such as how sponsorship enhances the image of businesses or brands or how sports event facilitate urban development. These studies tend to view sports events as tools to create political or economic benefits rather than exploring the governance or management of the events themselves. In addition, most of the discussion in sports governance in the board of directors of a single and permanently established sports organization. There have been few attempts to analyse governance in a short-term, policy-driven project context. For this reason, this study focuses on the issue of network governance, specifically the event delivery capacity of the governance network established to deliver a global multi-sport event. In this case, the governance network includes organizations ranging from local to international level, and both government and non-government organizations.

II. Theoretical review

This study used governance network theory and theories related to inter-organizational relationships as the framework for conceptualizing and exploring network development, structure and performance. The study utilized a qualitative research design based on content analysis of documents and semi-structured interviews of representatives of network member organizations in order to examine the topics as follows;

- 1.How did the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009 develop?
- 2.What are the structural characteristics of the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009?

3. What are the perceptions held by network members of the performance of the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009?

Since the objective of the study is to understand the governance structure and relationships among the stakeholders involved in governing the World Games 2009, it is necessary to focus on two related but distinct areas of literature: inter-organizational relationships (IORs) and network theory. When it comes to IORs, some studies analyze them from a “dyadic” perspective while others choose to analyze them by using the concept of networks. The basic assumption of the present study is that the inefficiency of the interactions among each organization may result in the whole network's failure—that may cause the failure of event delivery capacity, the chapter begins with the introduction of IORs, including why relationships are built between two organizations and how these reasons affect the types of IORs developed. The concept of networks is introduced in the second part of this review, specifically the governance of networks and the relationship between different forms of governance and effectiveness.

Inter-organizational relationships

General discussions of IORs have addressed the issue of control and management of linkages. Van de Ven, Walker, and Listen have tried to analyze these linkages from three levels: individual, cluster relationships and a whole network.² IORs can be analyzed through in-depth observation about how the linkage is maintained through the compromises among the organizations.

² K. G. Provan, “The federation as an interorganizational linkage network,” *The academy of management review*, 8. 1(NY, January, 1983): 79-89.

Oliver directly analyzed the formation of IORs from the organizational prospective and investigated the purposes that organizations sought to establish linkages with each other³. She concluded six determinants -necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy may affect the type of IORs that organizations may choose. Most of the time, organizations form the relationship voluntarily in order to solve the problem of asymmetry in power or try to increase their efficiency, stability or legitimacy through the exchange of resource. Unlike many literatures focused on voluntary relationships, Oliver mentioned that “necessity” is a determinant to differentiate those mandated and voluntary relationships, she thinks that the relationship might not occurred voluntarily unless it is dictated by higher authorities to meet the requirements. It is worth noting that mandated relationships may increase the frequency of interactions between respective organizations, and reduce their perception to environment.⁴ Organizations may need to conform to the dictates of a higher authority so as not to suffer from the loss of resources or be expelled from the field. The determinant is more appropriate to explain the interactions between governmental organizations or non-governmental organizations.

To improve efficiency, acquire resources, avoid crises, increase profit, reduce costs, and increase legitimacy are common goals of profit oriented organizations. Based on these goals, Barringer & Harrison used six theoretical paradigms—transaction costs economics, resource dependence, strategic choice, and stakeholder theory of the firm, organizational learning, and

³ C. Oliver, “Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and future directions,” *The academy of management review*, 75.2(NY, April, 1990): 241-265.

⁴ Oliver, C. “Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and future directions,” 241-265.

institutional theory to explain the formation of IORs amongst profit seeking firms.⁵

Transaction cost economics (TCE)

The purest application of transaction cost economics (TCE) is to decide whether to make or to buy so as to minimize the production and transaction cost and increase the profit as well. Firms choose different type of IORs for different reason. To a local firm that wants to manage foreign market, it may establish joint ventures to avoid the cost of opportunism, monitoring, management of internalized activity; while to a firm that wants to minimize transaction cost by specializing the essential activities may choose to form a network. Nevertheless, TCE is criticized by some studies for only using an economic perspective to explain the formation of relationships and neglects other issues such as the possibility of conflicts during the cooperation.

Resource dependence theory

Resource dependence theory focuses on the resources that must be obtained from outside to make organizations survive or prosper. Hence, organizations need to interact with the environment to obtain resources. The resources could be money, land, time, knowledge, contacts, reputation, and trust. Organizations need to acquire the control of critical resource to decrease the dependence on other organizations and increase the dependence of other organizations on them. In order to achieve the goals, organizations will enter into partnerships to take advantage of complementary asset, and increase the

⁵B. R. Barringer & J. S. Harrison, "Walking a tightrope: Creating value through interorganizational relationships," *Journal of Management*, 26.3(Bingley, June, 2000): 367- 403.

power relative to other organizations. This theory is criticized for it doesn't mention how to implement the resource to develop the competencies.

Strategic choice

Strategic choice basically develops out of economic perspective that firms form alliance for some strategic reasons, such as to increase their market power, which means to reduce cost or to provide attractive services.⁶ This theory somewhat combines TCE and resource dependence theory to explain how the firms use their strategic plans to seek out the resource and decrease the cost; in the meanwhile, strategic choice theory perceives that political relationship as a tool to increase competitiveness. This idea wasn't mentioned in earlier theories.

Stakeholder theory

To a firm, stakeholders can be a group or individuals that affect or be affected by a firm. Merrilees, Getz & O'Brien identifies three salient features that stakeholders have-interdependency, affecting/being affected by the organization and the sense of an interest or right in the organization.⁷ Based on the contracts or informal agreement, these stakeholders form a network. The positions of these stakeholders are decided by how the organizations manage the resources. Thus, the importance of each stakeholder may vary, and sometimes these stakeholders may be competing groups for the multiple interests. An effective stakeholder management is to decide which stakeholder

⁶ Barringer & Harrison, "Walking a tightrope: Creating value through interorganizational relationships," 367-403.

⁷ B. Merrilees, D. Getz & D. O'Brien, "Marketing Stakeholder Analysis - branding the Brisbane Goodwill Games," *European Journal of Marketing*, 39.9 (Bingley, September, 2005): 1060-1077.

matters most.⁸ For the importance of Stakeholders differs. Clarkson classified stakeholders to primary and secondary. If the stakeholders are vital for the survival of the organization, they are primary stakeholders; if they do not, they are secondary stakeholders. From a marketing perspective, the primary stakeholders for a sports event are those who have commercial influence, and the secondary stakeholders may be the sport bodies and government.⁹

Learning theory

Proponents of organizational learning suggest that organizations form IORs for the sake of learning. Also, learning is seen as an effective way for a firm to transfer knowledge across firms. That explains why two companies may choose to have interlocking directorates to have a channel for exchanging knowledge and information. A firm's learning ability-called "absorptive ability", is defined by Cohen and Levinthal as the ability to "recognize the value of new, external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends."¹⁰ The ability is based on a firm's prior experience, and the quality of the employees, systems, incentives, and organization culture.¹¹ However, the theory is criticized for it stresses too much on the advantage of learning but neglects the cost during the process such as training the employee or updates the systems.

⁸ Barringer & Harrison, "Walking a tightrope: Creating value through interorganizational relationships," 367-403.

⁹ Merrilees, Getz & O'Brien, "Marketing Stakeholder Analysis - branding the Brisbane Goodwill Games. *European Journal of Marketing*," 1060-1077.

¹⁰ Wesley M. Cohen, Daniel A. Levinthal, "Fortune Favors the Prepared Firm," *Management Science*, 40.2 (Linthicum, February, 1994): 227-251.

¹¹ Barringer & Harrison, "Walking a tightrope: Creating value through interorganizational relationships," 367-403.

Institutional theory

Finally, institutional theory assumes that external pressures motivate firms to get legitimacy. To a firm, legitimacy is “a key to the doors to gain access to critical resource and expertise.¹²” Hence, a small firm may try to declare the alliance with other well-known firms or mimics the mode of successful firms to enhance a firm’s reputation or demonstrate social worthiness. From the six paradigms listed above we can find that firms form IORs with other organizations may out of either economic or political reasons, or, both. These different reasons combined together forming different contingencies for individual firm that also affect the types of IORs for firms choose to build.

Summary

Since the contingencies that firms face are complex and expanding, contingencies and needs for different firms also vary. Some may want to increase efficiency and more profit by avoiding crisis when others by increasing legitimacy and getting more resources. The studies of IORs have, however, focused almost exclusively on dyadic analyses between for-profit firms and may not fully explain the nature of IORs between not-for-profit organizations.

From a theoretical perspective, a non-profit organization, especially the organization established for the implementation of policy, the economic motivation for organizations to form relationships could be less important. That

¹² Barringer & Harrison, “Walking a tightrope: Creating value through interorganizational relationships,” 367-403.

means organizations may not need to form a relationship just because they want to decrease transaction cost or because they want to learn some knowledge with each other; also they do not need to make strategic choice to find a partner, since the relationships may be formed for policy reasons, rather than economic reasons. In other words, these kinds of relationships could be formed because they are mandatory rather than through the choice of two organizations. However, how the resources are distributed in different organizations is an important issue in the formation of IORs, which is not mentioned in resource dependence theory but it does mention that organizations need to build the ties for reasons. In addition, how resources are distributed depends on which organization has the leading position also matters to the effectiveness. Hence, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory are still important when it comes to the IORs in non-profit organizations.

Networks

In the issue of IORs, some scholars focus on the motivation of for-profit organizations to form the ties with others from economic views, while other scholars concern about the “collectives of IORs” in non-profit organizations. Provan, for example, concerns about the effectiveness of the cooperation, especially in medical organizations.

In 1983, Provan made three distinct levels of analysis in IORs, the first level focuses on individual dyads so as to gain an in-depth understanding of linkage evolution and maintenance. The second is on cluster of dyadic relations maintained by a focal organization so as to explain why or when organizations form linkages in terms of its structure and activities. And the last level is on entire network of linkage organizations and the behavior and activities of an

entire group of connected organizations as well as those specific IORs that compromise the network is examined. The network level seems to be a new perspective to analyze IORs besides dyadic relationship. However, no matter in what level of analysis, effectiveness is still a critical concept, and the different level of analysis just tries to answer the key question of “effectiveness for whom.”¹³ In the following section, the definition of networks, the form of networks, and the concept of network governance are reviewed.

Definition of network

Some studies define a network as “a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the nodes” and think network as “multilateral collectivities, networks can become extremely complex entities that require explanations that go well beyond the dyadic approaches that have been traditionally discussed in the organization theory and strategic management literature.”¹⁴ While Podolny & Page further defines network as “Any collection of actors ($N \geq 2$) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another, and at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.”¹⁵ Provan & Kenis view networks as “groups of three or more legally autonomous organisations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal. Such networks may be self-initiated, by

¹³ K. G. Provan, A. Fish, & J. Sydow, “Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks,” *Journal of Management*, 33. 3 (CA, June, 2007): 479-516.

¹⁴ Provan., Fish, & Sydow, “Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks,” 479-516.

¹⁵ J. M. Podolny & K. L. Page, “Network forms of organization,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24(Cheltenham, Numb,1998): 57-76.

network members themselves, or may be mandated or contracted.”¹⁶

Through the definition listed above, it can be found that the definition of network more or less base on traditional organisation theory. They believe that organisations form the ties for getting resources through exchanges, and the reward of the exchange is to reach the individual goal. The idea of “network” is perceived nothing but the collectives of nodes and ties. However, in Podolny & Page's definition, the idea of “authority” was mentioned, that means the “governance of the whole network” became an issue.¹⁷ Moreover, the idea of “collective goal” is also mentioned in network theory. Traditional organizational theories tend to focus on individual goal, and collective goal may be achieved if individual organisations can act effectively with other organisations. But Provan & Milward took the network formed with mental health organisations for example, and said that:

*If the overall well-being of clients is a goal, then effectiveness must be assessed at the network level, since client well-being depends on the integrated and coordinated actions of many different agencies separately providing shelter, transportation, food, and health, mental health legal, vocational, recreational, family, and income support services.*¹⁸

As a result, what matters in the idea of a “network” could be viewing network as a unit to analyse and concern about the governance issue, if the goal

¹⁶ K. G. Provan & P. Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18. 2 (LA, August, 2007): 229-252.

¹⁷ Podolny & Page, “Network forms of organization,” 57-76.

¹⁸ K. G. Provan & H. B. Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health Systems,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 40 (NY, March, 1995): 1-33.

of the network matters. In addition, different definitions of network between traditional and new perspectives have led to two different schools of thought being established on how to analyse networks. Some studies made a distinction between micro-level and macro-level network focus, while others refer to the distinction the egocentric network versus whole network. Two basic approaches are developed hereafter: the “network analytical” approach and the “network as a form of governance” approach.¹⁹

Governance in networks

The governance of organizations has been mentioned in many IORs literature for the issue is highly related to effectiveness. The concept of governance is often pertinent to the idea of direction, control and regulation. In sports field, governance could mean to establish a direction or strategy to guide the sports organization and to control its activities so as to attain the outcomes effectively.²⁰ Most of the studies in governance concern about how the board of individual organization guide and monitor the participants to attain its goal. It suggests that the theme of governance is in delivering the outcome effectively for the organization. However, the object of governance moves from organization to network itself. Just as Provan & Kenis mentions that “the study of effectiveness has been problematic at organizational level and network levels, especially regarding the key question, effectiveness for whom?”

Since the network effectiveness is defined as “the attainment of positive network-level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual

¹⁹ Provan & Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” 229-252.

²⁰ R. Hoye & G. Cuskelly, *Sport governance* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).

organizational participants acting independently”,²¹ it is necessary to discuss in a broader level so as to include all the organizations. The focus of network governance is in how different extent of centrality affects the range of governance in the whole network and purely discusses the number, size and type of the cliques in the network. The properties of analysis help to analyze the form of governance in organizations and networks.

Forms of network governance

Based on two dimensions—the extent of centralization and the governance of network is from external or internal, Provan & Kenis identify three forms of network governance? Participant-governed networks, lead organization-governed networks and network administrative organization (NAO). In addition, for the form of governance is determined by decision makers rather than simply emerge randomly, to understand the key factors that are perceived could affect the effectiveness of form of governance is important. Provan & Kenis further propose the four predictors - trust, number of participants, goal consensus, and need for network-level competencies can be used to explain why decision makers choose one form over another when the contingency changes. Three forms of network governance and the indicators in each form are introduced in sequence.

Participant-governed networks

Namely, the form of participant-governed networks is governed by the members in the network. If the network is highly decentralized, then the

²¹ Provan & Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” 229-252.

members have relatively equal basis in governance, and no single entity can represent the whole network. This form often may use in smaller network, so the governance can be shared by all the participants in the network. The number of participants should be few so as to keep the frequency communication and strengthen trust and goal consensus. However, whilst more new-coming members enter the network, the density of trust ties and consensus in goal may decrease, such form of governance may become less effective, and the decision may tend to adopt other forms of governance. In addition, if interdependent task requirements are high, or there is strong pressure outside the network, demanding the whole network to enhance in some way, then the effectiveness of this governance will be less because individual organization doesn't have enough competency to fulfill the task by itself; however, for lead organization-governed network and network-governed administrative organization are more effective in dealing with high interdependency tasks and external pressure.²²

Lead organization-governed networks

When the network is centralized to extreme, some lead organization-governed networks may control the process of governance since they relatively have more resource or legitimacy than other members in the network or is simply mandated by external funding entity, hence, the extent of goal consensus is moderately low. The function of the lead organization may “underwrite the cost of network administration on its own, receive resource contributions from network members, or seek and control access to external

²² Provan & Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” 229-252.

funding through grants or government funding.”²³ Except the specific function, the lead organization still provides services as other members do. Compared with the participant-governed network, this network has very low density in trust ties and lower goal consensus for the network has moderate number of participants and the governance is highly centralized.

Network administrative organization (NAO)

The third form, network administrative organization (NAO), has an independent administrative entity outside the whole network, and the entity plays a key role in coordinating and sustaining the network.²⁴ NAO can be seen as an agent that “acquire for and then distributes resources to the network” and is designated to “guide, coordinate, and legitimize network activities or to monitor service provision” as well.²⁵ It can be either a formal organization with its staff, executive directors and board members –these members may include all or a subset of network members, or runs by an individual.²⁶ Just like lead organizations, sometimes an NAO can be run by government through funding and/or network facilitation in the beginning (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2007, p.236). Still, unlike lead organizations, NAO does not have to provide services as other members in the networks. Compared with the other two forms of governance, the density of trust in this form of governance is moderate, and the

²³ Provan & Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” 229-252.

²⁴ K. G. Provan & H. B. Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” *Public Administration Review*, 61.4 (NY, July/August, 2001): 414-423.

²⁵ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

²⁶ Provan & Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” 229-252.

goal consensus is moderately high since the NAO is also monitored by members in the network at the same time. Take the General Association of International Sports Federations (GAFIS) for example, the organization was created to “unite, support and promote its member International Sports Federations (IFs) and Organizations for the co-ordination and protection of their common aims and interests, communication and co-operation, while at the same time conserving and respecting their autonomy”(AGFIS, n.d). There are 104 members in the network, so it is necessary to have a centralized network so as to guarantee the effectiveness of the network. Meanwhile, the boards of directors are selected by its members, so members have a channel to monitor AGFIS.

Evaluation of the network effectiveness

Different networks have different features, and these features may affect the criteria to evaluate its effectiveness. For example, to evaluate the effectiveness of a public-sector organizational network could be more difficult than evaluating the effectiveness of a for-profit network, since the reduced resource or increased dependence are “less likely to be seen as a threat to survival”.²⁷ Moreover, the stakeholders can not be identified purely from an economic perspective, but need to be identified in terms of their legitimacy in relation to the network based on a hierarchy of their contribution to and power within the network. Hence, Provan & Milward categorised the constituents of public-sector organisational networks as: principals, agents and clients. Principals are in charge of monitoring and funding the network and its

²⁷ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

activities; while agents serve as administrators and service-level professionals in the network. Last, clients are those who actually receive the services provided by the network. To evaluate the effectiveness of network, the first step is to identify the stakeholders which, in this case, are principals and agents, including primary funders and regulators, the NAO and other member organisations. Then, the second step is to analyse a network in five dimensions, namely: network membership, the extent of service that provided by the network, strength of relationships, multiplexity and administrative structure.²⁸ These are now discussed in turn.

The focus in network membership should be on “the ebb and flow agencies to or from networks”²⁹, especially the numbers of core agencies that provide critical services, so the cost of coordination could be controlled. Secondly, the extent of service that is provided by the network is evaluated by how much the needed service can be provided by the network. In a highly broker network, NAO should be evaluated, for it is in charge of all the network participants and the resource distribution. The third dimension is to assess the strength of relationships. Generally speaking, those relationships that are more formally established, such as on the basis of a contract, are stronger than those formed solely on the basis of trust and commitment built on a history of interactions.³⁰ The fourth dimension, multiplexity, refers to the nature of relationships between two organisations being stronger if they have a relationship built on more than one exchange. In other words, if two

²⁸ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

²⁹ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

³⁰ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

organisations have multiple ties between each other, then, even if for some reason one of the ties break, they can still sustain their relationship through other ties. In other words, it guarantees the availability of continuing service for clients. The presence of an NAO indicates the network is a more viable form than other network types and that resources have been committed to developing the network. The networks without an NAO require a high level of commitment to achieve network goals and to foster interorganisational cooperation by member agencies; these two conditions are perceived to be more difficult to sustain; hence, the NAO network is perceived to be more effective.³¹

However, not all networks exist permanently. For instance, a network may simply be established for a specific project, such as those associated with an organizing committee for a major sport event. This type of network dissolves with the expiration of the project and thus can be considered to be a project network with different features. Thus the criteria to evaluate this special type of governance network also need to be discussed. Larson & Wikstrom applied stakeholder theory to discuss the IORs among the stakeholders in a (temporary) project network.³² A project network is temporally limited, dynamically changing, and is open in the sense that there are no definite criteria by which the boundary of the network may be identified and controlled. Moreover, it does not have any legitimate authority for the network as a whole. Just like other networks, stakeholders in projects also have different objectives and

³¹ Provan & Milward, "Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks," 414-423.

³² M. Larson & E. Wikström, "Relational interaction processes in project networks: the consent and negotiation perspectives," *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 23.3 (Amsterdam, September, 2007): 327-352.

power. The stakeholder who has relatively more resources and higher authority has more power. Unlike Provan, Larson & Wikstrom are more concerned about informal relationships, which mean the relationships forming on the basis of trust and commitment rather than more formal, contract-based relationships.³³

They propose that the higher the level of consensus among network stakeholders, the less chance for conflicts to emerge. The idea of consensus includes the concept of commitment and trust which takes time to develop within a network. However, for organisations in project networks, the time for developing trust is limited, and the incentives for building trust may be diminished as network member recognise that the cooperative relationships disappear after the project is completed. Hence, “trust” in project networks is perceived to be lower, and this may result in ineffectiveness for the whole network.

Summary

The research on IORs is primarily concerned about the impact of dyadic or network ties on a firm's performance; which types of links are the most or least beneficial to individual network members; which network positions might be most or least influential and how the position of organisations in a network might shift over time in response to changes within and outside network.³⁴ In network theory, the unit of analysis moves from dyadic ties to the whole network. This section has reviewed the concept of networks and how to use networks as a form of governance, as well as how contingency issues affect the

³³ M. Larson & E. Wikström, “Organizing events: Managing conflict and consensus in a political market square,” *Event Management*, 7.1 (NY, 2001): 51-65.

³⁴ Provan, Fish, & Sydow, “Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks,” 479-516.

development of networks. And finally, how to evaluate the effectiveness of networks, especially in non-profit networks and project networks.

III. Results

The purpose of this section is to present the results of the data analysis procedures used to address the three research questions investigated in this study:

1. How did the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009 develop?
2. What are the structural characteristics of the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009?
3. What are the perceptions held by network members of the performance of the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009?

Research question 1 - How did the governance network responsible for organizing the World Games 2009 develop?

In this section, the relationships between all the organizations relevant to the World Games 2009 are presented based on the analysis of documents and the data collected from the semi-structure interviews. An important element in understanding the governance network in place for the World Games 2009 is the stages through which the network has evolved as the relationships between network member organisations and the organisations involved changed at each stage. The development of the network can be separated into three distinct

stages: (1) the network and inter-organisational relationships that existed prior to bidding for the World Games 2009; (2) the network and inter-organisational relationships created during the bidding stage; and (3) and the network and inter-organisational relationships in place in the lead up to the actual event being held in 2009.

Stage 1: Prior to bidding for the World Games

According to the Olympic Charter, the IOC, IFs and National Olympic Committees (NOCs) are the three main constituents of the Olympic Movement.³⁵ IOC may recognize IFs and NOCs and “the activities of which are linked to its mission and role” and the “Olympic Charter.”³⁶ At the same time, IFs may recognize National Sports Federations (NFs) and keep contact with NOCs so as to facilitate the promotion of sports at the national level.

The Sports Affairs Council (SAC) was founded in 1997, which is an organisation at the national level in Taiwan. In addition, the SAC provides the funding support to the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC), (NFs) and Republic of China Sports Federation (ROCSF). The mission of CTOC, the NOC in Taiwan, is to assist IOC to “develop, promote and protect Olympic Movement in their respective countries, in accordance with the Olympic Charter”.³⁷ In order to fulfill the mission, CTOC has the exclusive authority to recognise NFs to be the official communication window for IFs so as to facilitate the process of communication between international level and national level.

The ROCSF's main task is to provide technical assistance to its members

³⁵International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter* (Lausanne, Switzerland, 2007).

³⁶ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter*.

³⁷ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Charter*.

(the NFs and local government sports federations). The members of ROCSF are not necessarily the federations recognised by CTOC, as long as it is evaluated as a well-run organisation. At the international level, the IOC is dominant and makes main principals in Olympic Movement; while at the national level, the dominant organisation is SAC, for it controls the majority of resources for sport organisations and decides the task each organisation is assigned. The network between these organizations is depicted in **Figure 1**.




Figure 1 Network prior to bidding for the World Games 2009

Stage 2: Bidding for the World Games 2009

Since hosting international sport events is one of the most important sports policies in Taiwan, the IOC member for Taiwan, Mr. Ching-Kuo Wu, played an important role for Taiwan in bidding for the event. The staff of CTOC stated that:

Ching-Kuo Wu is the coordinator between IOC and IWGA during the bidding process. C.K. Wu has personal relationship with the president of IWGA, Ron Froehlich and has unspoken consensus in Kaohsiung City bidding for the World Games 2009.

In July 2002, the SAC invited the president of IWGA, Ron Froehlich, to visit Taiwan and demonstrated Taiwan's intention to bid for the World Games in 2009. As the staff in CTOC said, SAC was mindful of the importance of supporting the bid: “for SAC knew that showing the support from the country is a key factor in winning the bid of the World Games.” In the bidding stage, SAC “is the authority and has the right to supervise the whole bidding plan and in charge of all the funding plans” (SAC staff member). In 2003, SAC mandated CTOC to conduct an evaluation of hosting the Games and the results of the evaluation were reported to the mayor of Kaohsiung City Government (KCG), Frank Hsieh. In the same year July, the SAC formally nominated Kaohsiung City as the representative city for bidding for the rights to host the World Games 2009. On November, 2003, a bidding group comprising representatives from SAC, CTOC, KCG and university in Kaohsiung was formed.

The SAC was subsequently informed privately in May 2004 by the IWGA

that KCG had won the bid for the World Games 2009. One month later, the mayor of KCG signed the host city contract with the president of IWGA (Kaohsiung Organising Committee [KOC], n.d.). The SAC and CTOC were key players that helped Kaohsiung City to win the bid according to the staff of KOC:

Although the CTOC and AC both were very important, if there weren't SAC, we would not win the bid. Ching Kuo Wu (IOC member) brought the information back, so SAC formed a group to evaluate the feasibility and chose KCG to bid for the game. SAC helps a lot, especially in urban development.

In the bidding stage, the local organisation, KCG, began dominant role with SAC. It is interesting to note that the Federations (ROCSF), the national sports federations relevant to training do not have any specific function Games 2009 at this stage. The network between these bidding stage is depicted in **Figure 2**.

Stage 3: Network in the lead up to the World Games 2009

IOC, IWGA, IFs and NFs

Since IOC grants its patronage to the World Games, the IWGA accepts the Olympic Charter (IWGA, n.d.). That means that International Sports Federations (IFs), the CTOC and National Sports Federations (NFs) need to follow the Olympic Charter in organising the World Games 2009. Under this principal, the IWGA, IFs, NFs and KOC built a cooperative relationship. The relationship between the IWGA, IFs, NFs and the KOC was described by the staff of KOC as:




Figure 2 Network during the bidding stage for the World Games 2009

IWGA demands IFs to contact with KOC. After the communication, we (KOC) also keep in touch with NFs, IFs, NFs and KOC do three way the progress of agenda. After the communication between NFs and IFs, they make a request to KOC, for KOC is a professional service provider to IFs and NFs.

In addition, the NFs and IFs cooperate especially in technical matters as described by the staff of KCG: “technical directors (TD) assigned by the IFs cooperate with the event managers [the event of World Game 2009], who are

the secretary of generals of NFs.”

SAC, CTOC, KOC, NFs

Because the World Games is also part of the Olympic Movement, the SAC mandated the CTOC to host a symposium for the “Olympic Games Formula” to educate the staff in KOC and NFs. In addition, under the request of SAC and KOC, two symposiums with the topic of “how to host mega sports events” were also held by CTOC for the World Games 2009. Also, CTOC assists KOC in developing procedures for such things as administering doping tests, hospitality services and athletes' registration.

Besides, in this stage, according to the description provided by the representatives of KCG, the SAC plays a very important role in “providing financial support-especially in building the main venue and repairing the existing ones.” The role of resource provider is assumed by the staff of CTOC to be “the main reason for KOC and SAC contact so frequently.” This assumption is also supported by KCG that KCG also perceived that “the mission of SAC is to provide resource and provide explanation for some laws.” Even the staff from the SAC agreed with this point of view and said that “SAC won't interfere in the inner affairs of KOC and KCG; but if KOC and KCG make a request, SAC will assist them - the KOC is the major organization in organizing the 2009 World Games.” In the meantime, however, the officers from the SAC still attended regular meetings and provided some suggestions to KOC, and KOC continued to make regular reports to the SAC.

IWGA, KCG and KOC

According to the host city contract signed by the Kaohsiung City Government (KCG), the Kaohsiung Organising Committee (KOC) was instituted in 2005 and “KOC executes all duties of KCG under the agreement.

KCG, at the same time, grants the required powers and authorities to the KOC...KCG is responsible towards IWGA for the fulfilment of the agreement by the KOC.” The IWGA has the obligation to “guarantee top class international competitions under the auspices of the IPs.”³⁸ Hence, in this stage, the main communication level became “international to local level” rather than “international to national level”, just as the staff of SAC—the organization in charge of national sports affairs, claimed that “The IWGA directly contacts with KOC and KCG. SAC won't actively contact IWGA.” In order to guarantee the “top class” competition, “KOC needs to follow the contract signed with IWGA and IFs, such as the regulations about venue, equipments, transportations, etc...” said the staff of KOC.

KCG, KCC and KOC

The host city contract specifies that the dominant organisations for the delivery of the World Games 2009 should be the KCG and the KOC. In fact, the KOC is structured as a “virtual government”, which means all the functions of departments in KOC imitates the structure of KCG, and most of the staff in the KOC have been seconded from the KCG. The Kaohsiung Organizing Committee (KOC) was instituted in 2005 as a foundation of legal person for the World Games 2009.³⁹ The KOC executes all duties of Kaohsiung city under the host city agreement signed by Kaohsiung city, and KOC is supervised by the KCG.⁴⁰ Kaohsiung city government (KCG) donated NTD 5 million for initiating the KOC. The KOC is instituted as a semi-official

³⁸International World Games Association, Rule of the World Games, 2005. Retrieved December 28, 2007.

³⁹ Kaohsiung City Government, Constitution of KOC (Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 2005).

⁴⁰ International World Game Association, Host City Contract: Kaohsiung Chinese Taipei World Games 2009 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 2005).

foundation. The financial resources come from two parts, one is from government, including Sports Affair Council and KCG; the other part is from private sponsors.

The board of directors, the supreme governing body of KOC, includes the president, the vice president, the CEO, the secretary general, the vice secretary general and 9 to 23 board members recommended by Kaohsiung city government (KCG). The structure of KOC is designed as a virtual government, which, in effect means the KOC operates as a semi-autonomous government department for the purposes of hosting the event. The president of the KOC is the Mayor of KCG and has the right to assign the CEO of KOC. The vice president, the secretary general and the vice secretary general of KOC are also in the same position in KCG. The CEO can assign one vice CEO and one sports manager with the consent of the board members. The nine panels are in charge of sports, urban development, and accommodation & transportation, marketing & public relations, culture & tourism, information & technology, administration, finance and security; the director of each panel is filled by an officer of KCG, as **Table 1** shows.

Table 1 The relationship between Panels of KOC and Department of KCG

Marketing and public relations	Bureau of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Information
Culture and Tourism	Bureau of Culture Affairs
Finance	Bureau of Finance
Administration	Bureau of Human Resource,
Information and Technology	Information center
Security	Bureau of Fire, Bureau of Police
Urban Development	Bureau of Urban Development
Accommodation and Transportation	Bureau of Transportation
Sports	Bureau of Education

IFs, SAC NFs, KSC and KOC

As the authority in national sports, the SAC is very concerned about the fact that this is the first time Taiwan has hosted and international multi-sports event; hence, SAC “suggested NFs and KOC to co-host all the sports events related to the 2009 World Games.” As result, the KOC followed the suggestion from the SAC and demanded that some NFs cooperate with them to conduct some warm up events, “and some NFs are channels to communicate with IFs” (KOC representative). However, as the officer in KOC explained “Not every IF has a good relationship with individual NF; just like not every NF has good interaction with KSC. Some have no problem while others have small/big problems.” Whenever this problem happens:

KOC will directly contact with IFs, but we will inform NFs afterwards. Actually, KOC signed contracts with IFs to confirm all the regulations for each sport event...we don't need NFs' help for this [signed contracts], but we still contact with NFs and ask NFs to keep in touch with IFs.

Besides working with NFs, the KOC also seeks support from local sports federations, and the staff of KOC noted:

KSC is in charge of 70 sports federations [in Kaohsiung], so their power is very huge. In theory, we don't need any help from KSC, however, if we want local sports' population to participate in the game, we will need its [KSC] help. KSC is in charge of all the sports affairs in Kaohsiung we can't ignore its importance. That is the reason why we wish KSC to help us to host the game.

Another reason for KOC to look for the help in local sports federations

was also mentioned by KOC:

In theory, we don't need any help from KSC, however, if we want local sports' population to participate in the game, we will need its [KSC] help. KSC is in charge of all the sports affairs in Kaohsiung we can't ignore its importance. That is the reason why we wish KSC can participate in hosting the game.

Moreover, the lack of trust to some NFs is also one of the major reasons for KOC to ask for the help from local sports federations. As the staff of KOC explained:

Each federation has different ability...some federations don't have enough abilities so we can only contact with IFs. But we won't ignore NFs but contact with local sports federations. Any cooperation between KOC and local sports federations is because NFs mandated local sports federations to assist KOC. Some of the NFs have some problems, but we have no idea. I learned a lesson from them before...that is why I seek for some help from KSC.

For KOC, it wishes “the World Games can help IWGA, KOC, IFs and NFs build strong relations with each other,” but it also recognizes that “things can't be perfect, but so far, we try hard to keep strong communication between each organization.”

Research question 2- What are the structural characteristics of the governance network responsible for organising the World Games 2009?

Prior to the government of Taiwan seeking to host the World Games 2009, the IOC and IFs were the sole international organisations which the SAC and

other organisations sought to maintain relationships. Through stages 1 to 3 of the development of the World Games 2009 network, the functions of the IOC remained stable and the IOC had no direct influence over other organisations. It only set basic principles, such as the memorandum between the IWGA and the IOC, the Olympic Charter, and the Lausanne Agreement for IWGA, IFs, NFs and the CTOC to follow. However, the ties between the IFs and other organisations became stronger. For instance, the IFs had communications with IWGA and KOC more frequently as these three organisations are the major ones in arranging the schedule and confirming all the details for the event, especially in regard to the technical aspects of the event delivery. As the staff of KOC noted:

IFs are in charge of the regulations for international competition, so we [KOC] need to sign contract with them, such as how long is the event or how many countries/athletes participate in the game.

At the national lever, the SAC, the organization regarded by the CTOC, NFs and the KOC as having a dominant role prior to the bidding stage, gradually decreased its dominance and served as much more like a resource provider or endorser to the KOC than as a supervisor. This point of view is supported by CTOC:

KOC tells SAC what it needs from CTOC, and SAC mandates CTOC to help KOC. The funds are paid by SAC to execute the project. What is worthy to note is that since the KOC runs as a “virtual government”, which means the design of the KOC is similar to the KCG, and half of the part-time staff are from the KCG. The legitimacy of the KOC to acquire resource increases.

Moreover, the KOC has the right to select the organisation to cooperate with, or, at least, to decide the extent of cooperation between different organisations based on their position as the NAO in the network.

Research question 3 - What are the perceptions held by network members of the performance of the governance network responsible for organising the World Games 2009?

From 2004, when KCG was first informed to be the host city for the World Games to 2007, the president of KOC has changed four times for political reasons. In addition, the CEO of the KOC also has changed twice after the first CEO, Dr. Chen, I-Heng, the professor of National Sun Yat-Sen University, was criticised for the lack of experience in sports management and for the fact he cannot serve as a full-time CEO. As the legislator of KCC mentioned that:

We are very concerned about the ability of the CEO of KOC. The first reason is: the CEO can only work part-time. We perceive that CEO should devote himself wholeheartedly to this event, but it is obviously that the CEO can't do that. Also, he is not majoring in sports or leisure. Third, he has no experience in sports event. He is incapable to be a CEO, no matter in time or in experience...Besides, the recruitment process in KOC also has some problems. The staff they recruited are mainly from language or administration research field, and don't have any experience in sports field, so they don't know how to plan the budget for a sports event.

In addition, KCC questioned the effectiveness of KOC and KCG that:

From 2003 to 2007, 3 years passed, the citizens in Kaohsiung still know nothing about the World Games or KOC... even though we gave KOC a

hundred million per year for organizing the World Games... The way for KOC the use the budget and resource is not effective. According to the regulation, after KOC list the budget, the list should be checked by financial department in KCG. However, those officers in KCG, they already have heavy loading, so they don't really care about that and approve everything KOC listed in budget plan.

This resulted in rapid personnel changes both in KOC and KCG and indirectly affected the preparation of the organizing schedule for the event. This situation led to concern being expressed from many network member organizations, such as the IWGA and the KCC. For example, according to the interview record of CTOC:

At the beginning, IWGA didn't trust KOC very much. The first reason is because the delaying of master plan for the World Games 2009. And the other one is after KOC already changed CEO twice. Still, in the bidding stage, Kaohsiung city proposed some construction plan for the venue, and IWGA also made some comments about that, however, when IWGA inquired for the progress of the plan in 2007, KOC can only provide IWGA the 2003 data, and every time, when KOC make presentation about the venue for the event to IWGA, KOC always changes the arrangement of the venues.

However, the concerns from these organizations seem to decrease with the appointment of a new CEO to the KOC in 2007, as KCC noted:

The new CEO has reputation internationally as an Olympian... she has experience in attending mega sports event, knowing how to host the game.

That is why we can trust her... if we trust her, we can give her more freedom and this helps her to do things more effectively; even the president of IWGA is very satisfied with the new CEO and the new mayor of KCG [also the president of KOC].

Not only did the IWGA and KCC initially have some weak trust ties with the KOC there were also some weaknesses in the level of trust in the relationship between the KOC and some NFs. This resulted in the role of some NFs being replaced by KSC in the process of organizing the game. The staff of KOC noted that:

Each NFs has different ability... some federations don't have enough abilities... some NFs have some problems, but we no one informs us. Learned a lesson from them [NFs] before... that is why I seek for some help from KSC. We feel very stressful because the NFs are not quite mature and they don't have experience in hosting Asian or world level games.

The staff of KCG, who also works for KOC, also supported this point of view:

NFs play two roles at the same time, the first is they need to cooperate with TD, so they need to have English ability, the other is professional ability. The event managers are from NFs, but the abilities of the staff there are not the same. For example, some staff only work part-time or they are in other counties. That is why we need the help from KSC. If event manager, then we can find deputy manager, from KSC so we can from a stronger team.

However, the SAC, CTOC and NFs seem to have different opinions in this case. Both SAC and NFs think that NFs should assist the KOC to host the event rather than the KSC, and as NFs stated “NFs follow the regulation of IFs, this is also the regulation of IWGA. We should follow the common regulation.” The CTOC also agreed and suggested that:

NFs are recognized by IFs, so IFs will directly communicate with them. KSC doesn't have experience or abilities as the NFs do. Most of the TDs from IFs also demand the cooperation with NFs. So the communication still should through NFs... In other words, KOC should strengthen the ties with NFs and let NFs know how could they cooperate with KOC for the success of World Games 2009.

The CTOC also noticed:

However, it seems that KOC totally relies on local school to assist them. Maybe it is because some single-events use the schools to be the venue, and some of the staff for the events are also from local schools. KOC seems to replace the “experienced” staff in NFs with the staff in local schools. It is understandable for KOC to use existing resources, however, they still need to ask for the help of NFs in organizing process rather than do it by itself, for the staff in NFs have experience in no matter in participating the game or hosting the games. Now they are having some test games, this should be a good chance to test the allocations of staff, so they should not only care about local human resources.

Despite this evidence that the KOC thinks the ability of NFs varies, the KOC still works very hard to keep communication channels open with the NFs

and tries to build strong cooperative ties between the IWGA, IFs, NFs and KSC. In addition, another reason for KOC to seek the help from KSC is because the NFs feel they may also need the help from local sports federation, just as the staff in KOC explained:

Not every IF has good relationship with its NF; just like not every NF has good interaction with KSC. Some [relationships] have no problem while others have small/big problems. That is why Some NFs demand the sports federation in Kaohsiung to assist KOC and some do not ... of courses we know NFs are channels to communicate with IFs, but sometimes we also directly contact with IFs, and we [KOC] will inform NFs afterwards. KOC signed contracts with IFs to confirm all the regulations for each sport event... we don't need NFs' help for this case, but we still contact with NFs and ask NFs to keep in touch with IFs. Now, the communication between IFs, NFs and KOC is very strong.

Now the relationships seem to be stronger since KOC also noticed this problem and already seek more help from NFs, just as the staff of NFs said that:

This morning, I was informed that in July [2008], NFs will send some representatives to KOC and help KOC to deal with the competition and venue. We hope to strengthen the ties between NFs, KOC, central government and international organizations; so the effectiveness will increase.

From these statements made by representatives from the SAC, CTOC, NFs, KCC, and the KOC it is apparent that there is a lack of trust between the

KOC and NFs as the KOC sought the assistance from local sports federations to prepare for the World Games. Besides the function of NFs being under valued, the CTOC, the organization in charge of international liaison, also faces the same problem. As the staff of CTOC said:

IWGA wants NOCs to send athletes to participate the World Games, just like the way that Olympic Games is ... but so far, there are only eight or nine countries willing to do so; CTOC is not the major organization that IWGA contact with ... besides, KOC already have their own contact channel with IFs directly.

In addition, the CTOC thinks there is still another issue neglected by KOC, which is about the “Olympic Formula” problem. The importance of the formula is mentioned in 2007 by the Secretary of General in CTOC that:

We are very concerned about Olympic formula, because CTOC signed the contract with IOC and we need to obey the contract. Now this formula has been implemented in other sports event... but the host organization... now we are worried about how to make them understand this formula... this is the only task for CTOC in this event... if there is something wrong, we have the obligation to take the responsibility, but we don't have right to supervise KOC.

The KOC also noticed that some of CTOC's functions are neglected during these days, but the KOC is trying to cooperate with the CTOC more often, just as the staff of KOC mentioned:

At the beginning, KOC didn't notice this problem. Even the World Games stressed on the relationship between IWGA and IFs, but personally, I think

we should rely on CTOC... not we have close relationships with CTOC, because they are every experienced in sports affairs, so we appeal them [CTOC] to hold some symposiums to provide some information about international sports events.

Since the new CEO and new president of Kaohsiung have been appointed, according to CTOC's observation, KOC does try to strengthen their cooperation with other organizations:

During this year, the [new] CEO strengthens the ties between KOC and CTOC; before this year, KOC didn't communicate with other organizations except SAC. We didn't have frequent interaction with KOC, so CTOC can't not involve in the event or provide few suggestions. Even we provided KOC any suggestion in the meeting, KOC seldom took them. Now the KCG and KOC have more interaction. Besides routine meeting, KOC also invites CTOC to attend the internal meeting now. KOC now asks us to support the hospitality service.

The last issue is about the relationship between KCG and the KOC. The KOC is a semi-governmental organization, and thus the style for public sector and private sector in dealing with things is different, just like the staff of KCG noted that:

For example, the CEO is from private sector and may think some processes are too redundant and ineffective, so it took some time to communicate between staff from private sector and staff from KCG. At the beginning, the full-time staff of KOC had no idea about how to write official document and other formal process, but now, with the help of

other staff from KCG, the problem has been solved... besides, the role of CEO is still very controversial, problem has been solved... besides, the role of CEO is still very controversial, because some people [in KCG] think the duty of CEO is to execute the policy made by KCG and no needs to have decision right.

The KCG, in the meantime criticized the over involvement of KCG for the event, saying that:

KOC doesn't care about how get sponsor from private sectors to support their funding, since they are semi-government, and know they can always get some money from government whenever needed. I think that is a different thinking between government and private sector. It is not usual. Even Japan and Germany [hosted the World Games in 2001 and 2005] cared about the revenue, because for them, the dominant organizations for the event should be private sectors, rather than government. But in Taiwan, government is over involved... because we want to use the event as a propaganda tool, so we can't take the risk to get failure. The government could only give them more money.

IV. Discussion and Conclusion

Network structure

Two features make the network formed for the organization of the World Games 2009 unique. First, the network should be considered a project network

as it was formed for a specific purpose, in this case, to host the World Games 2009. Second, because hosting an international sports event is one of the major sports and diplomacy policy foci of Taiwan, the government played a dominant role in the network and provided the majority of the funding support for relevant non-governmental organisations, especially the KOC. The KOC, as the NAO of the network, obtained resources from the international to local level and served as a resource distributor in this event. The operational context of the project network created around the KOC acting as the NAO meant that none of the network member organisations had any experience in working with KOC before and the majority of other network members. This situation made it difficult for network members to build significant levels of trust within their respective relationships in such a short time. In this study, the lack of trust evident between network members did result in some problems manifesting between organizations. For example, because the KOC was a newly established organization, and had no experience in cooperating with NFs before, KOC encountered a number of problems during their interactions with some NFs and sought to circumvent these problems by working directly with other organizations, such as local sports federations to replace the roles of NFs.

Larson & Wikstrom noticed that project networks usually do not have any legitimate authority for the network as a whole, hence the creation and maintenance of consensus between network member organizations is important for network performance.⁴¹ However, in this study, since the funding of organizations involved in the network came mostly from public sectors, the government authority, the SAC acted as a legitimate authority and some of the

⁴¹Larson & Wikström, "Relational interaction processes in project networks: the consent and negotiation perspectives," 327-352.

cooperative ties within the network eventuated more on the basis of demands from the SAC to other network members rather than any particular success at achieving consensus among some of these ties.

The development of network governance

According to the results, we can see that initially the SAC acted as a single and powerful funder to coordinate almost all the activities and key decisions in the network, at least at the national level as it had sufficient legitimacy and resources to play such a lead role. Hence, it is apparent that the form of network governance in the prior bidding stage was similar to what Provan & Kenis defined as a lead organization governance network. After Kaohsiung won the bid (i.e. the organizing stage), the KOC was established specifically for the purpose of governing the network; that means, the operational decisions relevant to run the entire network were designated to be made by the KOC, rather than the SAC. In this stage, the network is still highly centralized, but the form of governance changed from lead organisation-governance network to network administrative organisation (NAO). The role of the SAC in the organizing stage therefore became more focused on stimulating the growth of the KOC through targeted funding and to ensure the goals of the network were met; and, coordinating different departments in the central Taiwanese government to fulfill requests made by the KOC rather than directly solve any conflicts between network member organizations.

The development of the network governance structure for the World Games 2009 therefore seemed to have evolved over time rather than through a rational decision making process as suggested by Provan and Kenis.⁴² This is

⁴² Provan & Kenis, "Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and

evident in the decision by the SAC to bid for the World Games 2009, but after the KOC was established as the NAO, sought to simply respect whatever the KOC decided and exhibit very little interference in the relationships between the KOC and other network member organizations.

The evaluation of network effectiveness

Before any discussion of the criteria, that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the network, it is necessary to identify the key stakeholders. In relation to legitimacy and contribution within the network formed for the World Games 2009 in the organising stage, there were two categories of stakeholders: principals and agents. The principals included IWGA, as it monitored the activities of IFs and the KOC; the SAC, as it is in charge of monitoring the activities of the CTOC, NFs and the KOC; the KCC, for it has the right to control the budget for the event; and the KOC, which serves as the NAO. The IFs, NFs and the KSC are categorised as agents in the network because these organisations provided services to the KOC and the IWGA.

Provan and Milward proposed that it is more suitable to evaluate the effectiveness of a network comprising public sector organisations in five ways: the ebb and flow of agencies to and from the network; how much the need is fulfilled by the service provided; the strength of ties, which depends on how formal the relationships are; the multiplexity between the stakeholders, and, the administrative structure.⁴³ In this study, however, because the network formed in 2002 and will dissolve after 2009, and because almost all of the network member organizations involved are mandated to participate in the network

Effectiveness,” 229-252.

⁴³ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

either by the SAC or the IWGA other than simply choosing to participate in the network, it is not possible to evaluate network effectiveness in this case on the basis of the ebb and flow of agencies to and from the network. In addition, it is almost impossible to evaluate effectiveness by calculating the extent for clients' needs being fulfilled, because in this study, the clients are audience and athletes. Only after the Game can we evaluate the extent of fulfilment in clients' request. Hence, we can only evaluate network effectiveness by measuring the multiplexity between the stakeholders, the degree of formalisation in ties and observe its administrative structure. Since hosting the 2009 World Games successfully is the only program that connects the majority of network organisations and the fact that the cooperative tie between each organisation is based on demands imposed by higher authorities (such as the SAC or the KOC) the degree of multiplexity is low within the network.

Compared to trust, commitment and consensus, ties that are built on the basis of contractual obligations can be perceived to be more formal. However, in respect to the ties between the key stakeholders in the governance network, formal contractual ties only existed between the IWGA, IFs, KCG and the KOC. Other ties, such as the ties between the CTOC and the SAC, the SAC and NFs, and between the NFs and the KSC were only based on the general role of these organisations expressed in their respective constitutions, which were unrelated to the function each organisation performed in relation to the World Games 2009. It was apparent that these ties were maintained on the basis of informal commitments between organisations. It was also evident from the interviews with organisational members that the strength of the ties between the KOC and the KSC, or between the KOC and NFs were dependent on how much the KOC trusted these organisations. In this sense, the KOC,

acting as the NAO, had the freedom to choose its partners to cooperate with and to what extent in order to deliver the event.

The existence of an NAO is perceived to be more effective in large networks. Hence, to evaluate the extent to which an NAO “acquires and then distributes resources for and to the network” is important.⁴⁴ In the context of this study the KOC (as the NAO) was easily able to acquire the necessary resources to support the activities of the network as the World Games 2009 were perceived by both the central government and the KCG to be important for the implementation of major sports policy in Taiwan. In addition, the fact that Taiwan has had little experience in organising global sports events the organisations involved in the network simply followed the arrangements set out in the host city contract signed between the IWGA and the KCG, and leave the responsibility of distributing resources to the network to the KOC. In this sense evaluating the effectiveness of the NAO (the KOC) simply according to its ability getting and distributing resources isn't of little value, however, compared to other forms of network governance, the existence of the NAO (the KOC) implies that the network was more effective.

Conclusion

The study finds that the network formed for the World Games 2009 has the characteristic of project network and the form of governance is NAO. After comparing the different criteria proposed by Provan & Milward; Provan & Kenis and Larson Wikstrom, this study concluded that the extent of formalisation in relationships, multiplexity and the existence of NAO were

⁴⁴ Provan & Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks,” 414-423.

three criteria that were suitable to use in the analyse of the effectiveness for the network in this study. The effectiveness of the governance network in place for the World Games 2009 is not high, due to the lack of formality in defining the function, obligation and rights of each network member organisation. In addition, there is no power coordinator to deal with the conflicts that have emerged between network member organisations. This suggests that network members have not yet grasped network outcomes rather than impacts on individual organisations.

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